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The purpose of this chapter is to develop a biopolitical response to certain ethical questions 
posed by chronic disorders of consciousness (CDoC).  This response will draw on Giogio 
Agamben's account of homo sacer (Agamben 1998).  'Homo sacer' is a somewhat obscure 
term, found in Roman law, designating someone who has been expelled from the protection 
of the law.  By addressing Agamben's own analysis of the 'overcoma' and the case of Karen 
Quinlan, it will be argued that a distinctive normative status can be ascribed to the CDoC 
patient: the CDoC patient exemplifies the condition of homo sacer, and as such of what 
Agamben calls 'bare life'.  This argument poses a radical challenge to traditional approaches 
to bioethics and law.  Precisely because homo sacer is placed outside the law, traditional legal 
or moral conceptions of rights are rendered inapplicable.  However, it will also be argued that 
the Catholic tradition (defending the sanctity of life) or more utilitarian traditions (articulated 
in terms of quality of life) are rendered equally irrelevant.  It will be concluded that the CDoC 
patient has moral status as a radical experience of bare life – and thus of what it is to be 
human – albeit one that cannot be expressed or articulated by the patient.  The biopolitical 
challenge posed by CDoC thereby becomes that of facilitating the creative and poetic role of 
those who bear witness to the patient's experience.  The biopolitics of CDoC thereby rests in 
the articulation for the patient of a radically different ethical status. 
The chapter will proceed by firstly offering an overview of the group of conditions 
classified as chronic disorders of consciousness, before outlining Agamben's biopolitics, his 
key terms, zoē, bios and 'bare life', and thereby explicating the idea of homo sacer.  A series 
of Agamben's examples of homo sacer will be rehearsed, including that of the 'over-comatose' 
patient.  This will provide the core material necessary for articulating a biopolitics of CDoC, 
and in particular to explicate the relationship between the patient and their 'witness'. 
 
Chronic Disorders of Consciousness 
The term 'chronic disorder of consciousness' embraces a number of conditions within which 
the patient's self-awareness is limited or absent.  The permanent/persistent vegetative state 
(PVS) (Monti, Laureys & Owen, 2010), or unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (Laureys et 
al, 2010), is the most discussed example of a CDoC in the bioethics literature.  This has been 
defined as ‘wakefulness without awareness’ (Jennett and Plum, 1972) or more subtly as ‘a 
complex neurological condition in which patients appear to be awake but show no sign of 
awareness of themselves or their environment’ (Monti, Laureys & Owen, 2010).  Despite a 
lack of responsive to the environment, the patient's body functions, so that they do not need 
artificial support such as a respirator, and the will body will follow a cycle of sleeping and 
waking. The minimally conscious state (MCS) (Gosseries et. a., 2011), in which the patient is 
capable of brief periods of awareness, is also included in  CDoC, as may conditions such as 
locked-in syndrome (where the patient is aware, but is unable to express that awareness) and 
chronic comas.   
The moral problem of CDoC may be understood as lying in the challenge of 
articulating the nature of the condition.  It appears to violate the usual categorical distinctions 
through which sense is ordinarily made of everyday experience.  The patient in PVS is neither 
alive nor dead; the patient in MCS is neither conscious nor unconscious; neither an agent nor 
a passive object.  The very identity of the person before and after the trauma that initiated the 
CDoC may be in doubt.  The CDoC patient seemingly lacks memory of themselves prior to 
the trauma, and it is unclear how the intentions and preferences of that earlier person relate to 
or should be enacted on behalf of the patient.   
The definition of condition may, further, be dependent upon the development of 
appropriate diagnostic techniques, be these behavioural measures (such as the Glasgow Coma 
Scale or more recent Coma Recovery Scale (Kalmar & Giacino, 2005)) or more technically 
complex approaches such as brain imaging (including electroencephalography).  Medical 
diagnosis may thus shift as different techniques are employed.  But even if stable, diagnoses 
may not easily map on to the condition as it is experienced by relatives and lay observers of 
the patient (see Edgar et. al. 2014).  CDoC thereby becomes profoundly ambiguous, and the 
core concepts of traditional moral theory, such as 'autonomy', 'rights', 'dignity' and 'quality of 
life' cease to have an obvious or straightforward purchase. 
 
Homo Sacer 
Agamben finds the concept of 'homo sacer' in the work of a second century Roman 
grammarian, Sextus Pompeius Festus.  Here an archaic Roman law is recalled, according to 
which the judgement of a criminal to be 'home sacer' (a sacred man) entails that: 'It is not 
permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide' 
(Agamben 1998, p. 71).  Homo sacer may be killed, but not sacrificed (1998, p. 8].  This is to 
assert that this human's life has no meaning, either within the judicial order (for their killing 
would not amount to murder), nor in terms of any other cultural dimension.  The death of this 
human cannot acquire the meaning or status of a sacrifice, be it a sacrifice to the gods or a 
sacrifice for any other cause, such as, say, the preservation of the state.  The human is thereby 
reduced to what Agamben calls 'bare life'. 
Upon first encountering this example, it seems to be little more than a historical 
curiosity.  Agamben does find similar legal conceptions in other jurisdictions, such as the 
Anglo-Saxon notion of the bandit or 'wolf's head' (wulfesheud).  The bandit (epitomised by the 
legends of Robin Hood) stands outside the law, and significantly the very term 'wolf's head' is 
indicative of the expulsion of the human into an animal state (Agamben 1998, pp. 104-5).  Yet 
Agamben's claim is not simply that the form of homo sacer may be found elsewhere.  His 
argument is the more radical one that homo sacer is exemplary of the very structure of 
Western politics, and thus of biopolitics.  
Agamben's account of biopolitics draws upon, but significantly develops the work of 
Michel Foucault.  Foucault presents biopower as a product of modernity.  The exercise of 
sovereignty prior to the modern age is an exercise of power controlling 'legal subjects over 
whom the ultimate dominion was death' (1978, p. 142).  Due to the restricted development of 
technology, with its limited control over natural resources and dangers, death confronted the 
pre-modern subject as a continual threat.  The core power that the state has over the citizen is 
that of depriving them of life.  In contrast, as the forces of production develop in modernity, 
biopower can be realised as the control and promotion of life (and not the mere imposition of 
death).  As Foucault expresses this, biopower is exercised at the level of the body, and on life 
itself.  The life of the individual body, or the body of the species, is brought into 'the realm of 
explicit calculations' (1978, p 143).  Exercised in order to promote economic productivity 
within capitalism, biopower adjusts the human subject to capital, inserting bodies into the 
machinery of production and adjusting populations to economic processes (1978, p. 141).  
Foucault summarises the historical break so: 
For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose 
politics places his existence as a living being in question. (1978 p. 143). 
Agamben challenges Foucault's account by arguing that biopower is not unique to modernity.  
There is no historical rupture between pre-modern and modern power.  Rather it is only in 
modernity that it becomes clear that biopower is fundamental to sovereignty.  For Agamben: 
'It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of 
sovereign power' (1998 p. 6). 
While Foucault has a unified and singular conception of 'life', as the subject of 
biopower, Agamben appeals to the ancient Greek distinction between zoē and bios.  Zoē 
'expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings' (and hence the modern 
'zoology').  In contrast, bios 'indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a 
group' (1998, p. 1).  While on this initial account bios suggests a normative conception of the 
good life, more generally it is suggesting a life that is qualified or given meaning through 
participation in culture and politics.  Hence, the most obvious English term grounded in bios, 
in this specific sense, is not 'biology' (which continues to appeal to common living), but rather 
'biography'.  A biographical life is one that has meaning and form, and thus is necessarily 
lived within a culture.i 
The relationship of zoē and bios is further clarified, following Aristotle (in the Politics 
1253a 10-18), as a distinction between 'voice' and 'language' (Agamben 1998, pp. 7-8).  
Animals have a voice, but this is merely the capacity to express pain and pleasure.  It is only 
through language that the human being can articulate an understanding of the difference 
between justice and injustice.  For Agamben, to have a language presupposes living within the 
polis (and thus within a human culture).  The distinction between zoē and bios thereby allows 
Agamben to offer a subtle reinterpretation of Foucault's own appeal to Aristotle's definition of 
the human noted above: 'a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence'.  
For Agamben, this 'additional capacity' is the 'exclusive inclusion' of zoē within the polis 
(1998, p. 7).  It is precisely this paradoxical 'exclusive inclusion' that is fundamental to 
understanding Agamben's conception of biopolitics, and to his argument that biopolitics has, 
historically, underpinned all forms of Western state power.   
By using to the formulation 'exclusive inclusion', Agamben is arguing that zoē is not 
simply included in politics, as the raw material that is shaped by biopolitical techniques.  
Language is not merely added on to the voice of the animal.  Rather, the identity of the 
political body also rests upon a simultaneous exclusion of zoē.  It marks a moment of violence 
that underpins the law.  Here Agamben complements his account of Foucault through an 
appeal to the work of the Nazi jurist and political philosopher Carl Schmitt.  Two elements of 
Schmitt's work are in play in Agamben's argument.  Firstly, Schmitt argues that the distinction 
between friend and enemy lies at the centre of all political thought and action (2007).  
Schmitt's point is that a community acquires an identity and self-understanding of who it is 
only by recognising an enemy who it is not.  The task of the state is that of ensuring the 
existence of an enemy.  Crucially, the election of another as an enemy need have no 
grounding other that the will of the sovereign.  The categorisation of someone as 'enemy' is an 
act of arbitrary violence.   
The role of the other is securing one's identity parallels Foucault's accounts of madness 
and criminality.  The rational and enlightened subject knows who and what they are precisely 
in their contrast to those who they are not.  Thus, while retaining the form of Foucault's and 
Schmitt's argument, that identity is secured by focusing upon that which it is not, Agamben 
argues that Schmitt's friend/enemy distinction is not the fundamental one.  It is, rather, the 
distinction between zoē and bios that is fundamental.  Bios has identity precisely because it is 
not the form of zoē that is excluded from the political body.  The insane and the criminal are 
thus potentially returned to zoē (or more precisely, what Agamben terms 'bare life'). 
Schmitt's second contribution to this analysis lies in his definition of the sovereign, as 
the one who decides upon the state of exception (Schmitt 2005; Agamben 1998, p. 11).  This 
is to argue that sovereign power lies, not merely in the capacity to formulate law, but more 
fundamentally to suspend the rule of law, be this for society as a whole (as for example in the 
imposition of a state of emergency) or in the withdrawal of the protection of the law from an 
individual or group.  For Foucault, the exercise of sovereignty is pre-modern, and thus prior to 
biopolitics.  Agamben challenges this on two fronts.  Firstly, he argues that liberal 
government, despite its self-understanding as being rationally grounded, and indeed as having 
given zoē its true and just form as bios, is underpinned by the violence of sovereignty.  The 
rule of law is fragile, and can be suspended at any moment (see 1998 p. 9).ii  Secondly, 
Agamben reinterprets the Schmittean notion of sovereignty in biopolitical terms.  Sovereignty 
is the capacity to strip the status of bios from the political subject, and thus to return them to a 
condition of zoē.  Agamben's contention is that the declaration of the state of exception is an 
act of excluding zoē from the polis, and is thus fundamentally biopolitical. 
It is here that the significance of homo sacer as expressive of the fundamental structure 
of biopolitics may be understood.  Home sacer is the result of the exclusive inclusion.  As 
such it has been abandoned by the state.  The notion of 'abandonment' (and the 'ban') is 
crucial.  Homo sacer is a subject who, prior to judgement, was included in the state, and thus 
was under the rule of law, as bios and as a possessor of language.  Judgement upon them 
amounts to a decision, on the part of the sovereign, that the criminal is now an exception to 
usual legal processes.  Their being excluded from the state's protection does not, however, 
entail simply that the rule of the law is removed from them.  The very act of exclusion 
continues to include them within the law, for the category of 'homo sacer' is itself a legal 
construct and an act of the sovereign.  More precisely, homo sacer is not simply returned to a 
pre-political state of zoē.  Rather, in being stripped of political status they are condemned to 
the (political) condition of 'bare life'.  This term, 'bare life', is adopted from Walter Benjamin's 
essay 'The Critique of Violence' (1996), where it articulates the result of the sovereign 
violence that is seen to be fundamental to the exercise of the law (Agamben 1998, p. 65).  In 
being judged, the language of homo sacer is no longer heard, and all biographical significance 
is being stripped from them, so that neither their life nor death can have meaning. 
 
Overcoma 
In his exploration of the fundamental biopolitical structure of homo sacer, Agamben offers a 
series of examples or vignettes.  The most relevant to the chronic disorder of consciousness is 
that of the 'overcoma' or coma depassé (1998, pp. 160f).  What Agamben terms the classic 
coma 'is characterised by the loss of relational functions (consciousness, mobility, sensibility, 
reflexes)'.  The overcoma, as defined by the French neurophysiologists Mollaret and Goulon, 
entails a 'total abolition of relational life functions correspond[ing] to an equally total 
abolition of vegetative life functions' (1998, p. 160).  The continuing survival of the patient in 
an overcoma is therefore dependent upon the functioning of life support technology 
(maintaining respiration, and the functioning of vital organs).  The overcoma patient is 
'anatomy in motion', or even 'death in motion', for it amounts to a mere illustration of the 
physiological functioning of the body, no longer directed to the purpose of sustaining the 
patient's life (1998 p. 186).   
Considered as a purely natural process, which is to say as the result of disease or injury, 
the coma patient has been turned back to zoē.  They have been stripped of language, and if 
incapable of responding to stimuli from their environment, then they have lost voice as well.  
Yet Agamben's interest in the overcoma lies specifically in its construction as a political and 
cultural phenomenon.  The 'overcoma' is a technological and legal category.  The overcoma 
exists not because of natural processes, but because of advancements in medical technology 
that make this condition, that is neither life nor death, possible.  Crucially this entails that the 
status of the patient, as either living subject or as corpse (and thus as to whether they posses to 
the right to further life-support), is a legal issue.  Agamben seemingly delights in the defence 
offered by a man accused of murder.  The victim does not die immediately, but falls into an 
overcoma after the assault.  The victim dies only when doctors remove his life-support.  The 
(unsuccessful) legal defence is that the assailant is innocent of murder, for it is the doctors 
who killed the victim (1998, p. 163).   
The political position of the overcoma is further complicated by the development of 
organ transplant technology (and indeed in the above case, life-support is removed from the 
patient only after the heart is removed for transplantation).  The overcoma patient is 
potentially an ideal organ donor, except for the fact that they are not, unproblematically, dead.  
This tension leads to the articulation of new definitions of death in the notion of 'brain death' 
(being the death of the entire brain) (1998, p. 162).  Agamben finds this definition to be 
contradictory.  While the diagnosis of brain death (which itself is dependent upon the 
development of appropriate diagnostic technology) comes to supersede the traditional criteria 
(the stopping of heartbeat and the cessation of breathing) that characterised systematic or 
somatic death, it is still defended on the grounds that 'most studies… demonstrated the 
inevitability of somatic death following brain death' (Agamben 1998, p. 163, citing Lamb 
1988, p. 63).  The concept of brain death is thus not free-standing.  Brain death is death only 
because systematic death will occur shortly after the removal of life-support.  Brain death 
exists only in terms of a pragmatic definition that facilitates the legal harvesting of 
transplantable organs.  The biopolitics of technology and law thus combine to exclude the 
overcoma patient from the legal protection enjoyed by the living.  The overcoma patient 
becomes not zoē (which is to say, the result of a purely natural process) but bare life (the 
product of politics). 
It may be noted that the example of overcoma can be read as a further comment upon 
Foucault's historical distinction between sovereignty and biopolitics.  For Foucault it is the 
sovereign whose ultimate sanction is that of killing their subject, while biopower is exercised 
to sustain life.  In the case of the overcoma, biopower is indeed exercised to sustain the life of 
the organ recipient, but only by killing the donor.  As homo sacer, the overcoma patient can 
be killed, but not murdered. 
The case of Karen Quinlan further complicates this analysis.  Qunilan as diagnosed as 
being in an overcoma, when legal permission to remove life support was granted at the 
request of her parents .  Here the court adjudged Quinlan to be already dead.  After the 
removal of life-support, she continued to breath, and was thus recognised as being in a 
permanent vegetative state (PVS) (1998, pp. 163-4).  Agamben does not explicitly refer to 
PVS, or indeed to CDoC.  His interest in Quinlan's case is merely that it offers an extreme 
example of a body that has entered 'a zone of indetermination in which the words “life” and 
“death” have lost their meaning (1998, p 164).  What is significant here is that the CDoC 
patient cannot have life-support technology removed from them in order to facilitate organ 
transplantation.  Their (systematic) death can only be brought about prematurely by denying 
them hydration and nutrition, and so allowing them to die, or by actively killing them.  Their 
constitution as a biopolitical subject by medical technology (be this life-support or transplant 
technology) is thus of a different order to that of the overcoma patient.  The involvement of 
only minimal technological intervention in sustaining their life serves to highlight the role of 
the law in the constitution of the CDoC patient. 
To understand either the overcomatose or the CDoC patient as homo sacer is to argue 
that they can be killed but not sacrificed.  As Agamben expresses this, if the patient is not 
alive (given the legal constructions suggested above) then they cannot be murdered (as the 
failure of the above murder's defence demonstrated, for the doctor's who removed life-support 
form the victim were not prosecuted for murder), and nor can they be sacrificed, for being 
already dead, there is no living being to sacrifice (1998, p. 165). 
Orthodox bioethical approaches to the issue of CDoC may be articulated in terms of two 
broadly conceived strategies that challenge the implications of understanding the patient as 
homo sacer.  On the one hand, it may be argued that the patient is unambiguously a living 
being – bios and not mere zoē – and as such either has the rights and legal protection of any 
other citizen, or that, as living, their life is sacred.  Deontological and sanctity of life 
arguments may be marshalled in order to defend the patient, to conclude that the killing of the 
patient is, indeed, murder.  On the other hand, it may be argued that the patient can be 
sacrificed.  A quality of life argument can be formulated to the effect that the patient's body 
and life are no longer of any use to them (for lacking consciousness, they can have no quality 
of life).  Their body (or at least its organs) can be of use to others, and will contribute to 
raising the organ recipient's quality of life.  According to this argument the patient can be 
killed, but crucially their death can be given meaning, for their life is being sacrificed to the 
cause of another's medical treatment.  Agamben himself does not explore these arguments, 
beyond noting the tension between positions defending the patient as alive and as dead (1998, 
p. 164).  However, his analysis of homo sacer begins to highlight the fundamental inadequacy 
of these traditional bioethical approaches. 
The antimony of deontology and consequentialist ethics, whereby seemingly valid 
arguments can be given both in favour of and against supporting the life of the patient, can be 
understood as a result of biopolitics.  This is to argue that bioethics reproduces the structure of 
sovereign violence.  It was noted above that Agamben criticises liberalism for assuming that it 
has secured the just bios for zoē.  The liberal state is the normatively appropriate form of 
human life.  Thus, liberal conceptions such as human rights and the rule of law are assumed to 
be rationally defensible as normative absolutes.  For Agamben this assumption denies the 
sovereign violence (expressed, by Schmitt, both in the capacity to suspend the rule of law, and 
in the arbitrary designation of an enemy).  Crucially law, as a political structure underpinned 
by sovereignty, is understood by Agamben, following Schmitt, as a purely positive structure, 
which is to say a structure without normative or moral content.  Legal categories do not 
identify an entity that exists prior to and outside the law, and nor does the legal judgement 
express a moral truth.  Rather they constitute, in an act of accusation, an entity within the law 
(see Agamben 2008).  In a bioethics that is homologous with legal thinking, such as 
traditional deontology and consequentialism, antimonies occur because each side of the 
antimony is grounded in a different and opposite, but equally arbitrary, categorisation of the 
legal subject (in this case, the CDoC patient).  The failure of traditional ethics to respond 
coherently to CDoC is thus expressive of the biopolitical nature of legal and ethical thinking. 
While this analysis may identify a problem in the bioethics of CDoC, it does little to resolve 
it.  In practice, Agamben's own ethics remain tentative and critical, for while they are 
articulated in terms of the Aristotelian question of the good life, they appeal to a 'coming 
community', and a Messianic suspension of the law (and not, for example, to the ethics of 
contemporary or actual communities as might be found in communitarian approaches) (see 
Agamben 1993a).  Yet the text of Homo Sacer does nonetheless offer further resources for 
understanding CDoC, and for articulating the ethical challenged that the conditions pose. 
 
The Muselmann 
Two further vignettes of homo sacer will be briefly reviewed as having relevance to 
understanding CDoC.  These are a detail of ancient Roman law, vitae necisque potestas, 
where a father had power of life or death over a son; and the Muselmann, the most extreme 
victim of the death camp. 
Under the law of vitae necisque potestas the Roman citizen had an absolute power of 
life and death over his sons, and absolute in the sense that this is neither the responsibility of 
the father to punish the son's criminality, nor yet a product of the structure of the patriarchal 
family (Agamben 1998, p. 87).  Rather, the Roman citizen, as a son, enters political life as 
someone who can be killed.  That is to say, they enter politics not as natural life (zoē) but 
rather as bare life, someone who has at once been defined legally, but thereby excluded from 
legal protection.  As such, every citizen is at least initially homo sacer (1998, p 88).   
Such an example may initially seem to have little to do with CDoC patients.  Yet, as the 
example of Quinlan indicated, the survival of the patient may be dependent upon the decision 
of their relatives and carers.  This may be articulated in terms of the deep and tragic problem 
of how relatives and carers can come to understand, with any assurance, what is the just way 
in which to treat the patient.  The focus of the problem lies in the fact that the CDoC patient 
has typically lost language.  While a patient in a state of minimal consciousness may have 
moments of lucidity, and thus language use, this will be rare or absent in the case of PVS 
patients.  At best, the patient will have a voice, in the sense used above, in so far as they can 
express pain and pleasure in response to stimuli.  The interpretation of this voice, and its 
translation into language, becomes a challenge to which relatives and carers respond (see 
Edgar et. al., 2014).  This interpretation may be expressed in attempts to discover a language 
for the patient by finding in the patient's movements and gestures an expression of, not merely 
their pain or pleasure, but rather their sense of justice concerning the condition they are in.  
Here the relative and carer must struggle with metaphysical issues of personal identity, as the 
intentions and preferences of the person prior to the trauma that delivered them into a CDoC 
are reconstructed and mapped, often awkwardly and with difficulty, onto the voice, the 
movements and gestures, of the patient.iii  The relative is left with questions as to whether the 
patient, as they are now, would want earlier intentions (expressed perhaps in a living will) to 
be put into action, and thus  whether the patient now has any significant continuity with the 
pre-traumatic person.  Also the patient acquires a proxy language through the relatives' and 
carers' continuing interaction with them, by talking to them, responding to and observing 
them, taking them out into the public world beyond the hospital ward, and thus by presenting 
them, through the care taken in arranging their clothing, hair or make-up, as prepared for 
social interaction.   
The carers and relatives thus construct and maintain what may guardedly described as 
an 'illusion' of a bios for the patient.iv  They struggle to sustain meaning for the patient, as a 
continuing member of a family and wider community, in the face of bare life.  Yet crucially 
the patient ultimately has no language in order to participate in decisions about their care, or 
indeed their continued existence.  The patient is unable to protest the justice or injustice of 
their own condition, to deny or affirm the interpretations that are imposed upon them.  Thus 
the decision as to their continued existence falls upon those who can use language, the 
relatives and carers.  If the carers' understanding of the patient's voice is inadequate, or is a 
projection of their own quite understandable desires and frustrations, then the bios that the 
carer attributes to the patient may approach the same arbitrariness that was seen in the 
sovereign decision on the state of exception.  The CDoC patient becomes homo sacer to their 
relatives, akin to the Roman son to his father.  The example of the Muselmann will help to 
clarify further the nature and implications of this observation. 
The Muselmann (where the word is a derogatory term for 'Muslim') is for Agamben the 
most extreme figure within the Nazi death camps.  (Agamben draws significantly on the 
writings of Primo Levi in articulating the nature of the Muselmann.)  The death camp 
exemplifies much of the structure of modern biopolitics (and Agamben criticises Foucault for 
making the hospital and asylum, and not the camp, the institutional focuses of his account of 
biopower (Agamben 1998, p. 4)).  Under Nazism the Jew has the protection of the law 
systematically removed from them, rendering them homo sacer.  Yet within the camp, the 
Muselmann experiences an even more extreme subjugation.  The Muselmann loses the will to 
survive.  Their humiliation and fear strips from them consciousness and personality, 
rendering them utterly apathetic.  They are excluded even from the life of the camp, unable to 
communicate and shunned by other inhabitants.  'Mute and absolutely alone, he has passed 
into another world without memory and without grief' (Agamben 1998, p 185).  The 
Muselmann lacks language, but in their apathy even their voice is threatened.  They are 
unable to distinguish 'between the pangs of cold and the ferocity of the SS' (ibid.).   
While the CDoC patient has not undergone the systematic and intentional acts of 
degradation suffered by the Muselmann, for, as noted above, the CDoC patient is typically 
the victim of disease or injury and their status as bare life (as opposed to natural zoē) rests 
upon the legal construction of their status.  Yet there is still something in common.  Both 
CDoC patient and the Muselmann experience bare life at its extreme.  Both are stripped of 
language.  Conceivably the CDoC patient is no more aware of the difference between human 
and natural stimuli than is the Muselmann.  It is this extreme experience that is of normative 
importance for Agamben, and through which something akin to an ethical imperative can be 
derived from his analysis, and this in the role of the 'witness'. 
The figure of the Muselmann is complemented by that of the witness.  Agamben notes 
that a number of survivors of the camps are motivated by a desire to bear witness to what 
they have experienced (and indeed, it is exactly this witness that the Holocaust denier seeks 
to invalidate) (1999, p. 15).  Yet, precisely by surviving the camp, the witness has not had the 
extreme experience of the Muselmann.  They have not descended into those depths of 
inhumanity.  The Muselmann's experience is the most profound and penetrating.  It is, as it 
were, the pure experience of bare life.  But the Muselmann, robbed of language, cannot 
explicate that experience.  Muselmann and witness thus form a two-part structure, who 'like 
the tutor and the incapable person and the creator and his material, are inseparable; their 
unity-difference alone constitutes testimony' (1999, p. 150).  The survivor bearing witness not 
to the camp itself but to the experience of the Muselmann , and that an experience that they 
did not share and that cannot, strictly, be spoken, 'speaks only on the basis of an impossibility 
of speaking' (1999, p. 164). 
The moral status of the CDoC patient may be understood in these terms.  The patient, 
like the Muselmann, has the most extreme experience of bare life.  Agamben may be 
interpreted here as offering something akin to a sanctity of life argument.  Yet, the moral 
status of the patient lies not in the fact that they are alive (for they are only ambiguously so) 
and nor yet in that their existence is sanctified.  They are not 'sacred' in the usual meaning of 
the term, but only in the obscure and ambiguous sense of sacer (see Agamben 1998, p. 78-9 
on the interpretation of sacer).  The moral status of the patient lies, rather, in the fact that they 
experience bare life and thus what it is to be human in the face of biopower.  Like the 
Muselmann, it may be said of the CDoC patient that: 'the human being is the inhuman; the 
one whose humanity is completely destroyed is the one who is truly human' (1999, p. 133).  
As such, the CDoC patient requires a witness.   
Agamben is arguing that experience cannot be adequately expressed in language.  
There is always a remnant.  The failing of law, and a legally based bioethics, is that it does 
not acknowledge the fact that legal categories do not grasp the non-legal reality – legal 
thinking does not recognise a remnant.  It does not recognise the constitutive moment of 
accusation, and as such assumes that the particular case, the experience of the unique and 
individual patient, may be adequately incorporated into the broad categories of law.  An 
ethics of CDoC must, in contrast, be an ethics of witness.  It would lie in the frequently 
frustrating and perhaps even futile struggle to find a language, unique and appropriate, to the 
individual patient, and one that does away with the traditional, legalistic, categories of 
bioethics thought, such as dignity and respect (see Agamben 1999, p. 69).  It will offer a 
poetry that is shocking.  It is shocking precisely in that it will expose the fact that it has 
ultimately failed to grasp the experience of the CDoC patient.  It will be a poetry of 'an 
unprecedented lack of experience', as Agamben describes the poetry of Baudelaire (1993b, p. 
47).  As such, the struggle of the relative or carer to find a language to articulate the patient's 
experience, and as such to sustain a bios around the patient, will be one in which the relative 
and carer are aware of their own desires, biases and frustrations, and thus of how the patient 
continually escapes them.  While the bios that is constructed may be an illusion, it is a 
necessary illusion, and the only thing upon which a genuinely ethical debate, and as such an 
aspiration to an understanding of CDoC outside the abandonment of contemporary legal 
structures and biopolitics, can be performed.  A shocking poetry of witness will continue to 
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i It may be noted that Aristotle's famous definition of the human being as politikon zōon does not undermine 
Agamben's interpretation.  While humans may be social animals, they are not uniquely so.  Ants, sparrows 
and lions are social.  Yet such creatures lack a political life (bios politikos), which is to say a culturally 
chosen, developed and negotiated way of living together, that aspires to be the good life (and not merely that 
which is determined by nature). 
ii Agamben interprets the Hobbesian state of nature, not as a condition prior to the establishment of the 
state, but rather as 'a principle internal' to the state (1998, p. 105).  It marks the dissolution of the state in 
the state of war of all against all, where 'the man is a wolf to men' (pp. 105-6).  Yet it is also the fact that 
the sovereign is at once a role constituted by (and thus included in) the state and the social contract, and 
yet stands outside it (excluded) as the power to dissolve that contract. 
iii Technology complicates this issue somewhat.  Research using brain imaging techniques has suggested that 
some PVS patients may have an active mental life that they cannot express (Monti et. al. 2010).  This can 
involve responding to requests to think of specific events (such as to imagine playing tennis).  Such 
research both compounds the biopolitical construction of the CDoC patient as a technological subject, and 
give further, often perplexing and ambiguous material by which the patient's relatives can expected to 
interpret the patient's intentions and attitudes, which is to say, to construct a language for them. 
iv 'Illusion' here is used in the Hegelian sense of the German term 'Schein' (see Hegel 1973).  As such, it is a 
distorted representation of the truth (as opposed to a delusion, which is a deception, offering a 
representation of something that does not exist). 
